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Abstract 
Using Norwegian intergenerational data with a substantial part of the life-cycle earnings of 
children and almost the entire life-cycle earnings for their fathers, we present new estimates of 
intergenerational mobility. Extending the length of the fathers’ earnings windows from 5 to 
30 years increases the estimated elasticities. Varying the age of father at observation has the 
opposite effect. Our findings indicate that intergenerational earnings mobility may have been 
strongly overstated in many earlier studies with shorter earnings histories. Biases in the 
estimated elasticities appear to be related to age and/or life-cycle measurement errors more 
than persistency in the transitory innovations. 
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1. Introduction 
The differences in the estimates of intergenerational earnings mobility are remarkably high, 
across country and across time. As researchers have gained access to better data, they have 
tried to explain these differences. The distorting effect of transitory earnings shocks on the 
permanent income measure has been internalized in the literature by averaging several yearly 
observations, typically over 5 years or less (see for instance Solon (1992) and Zimmerman 
(1992)). Mazumder (2005) claims that 5 years is a far too small window, given the persistence 
characterizing the transitory shocks. He argues that the earlier estimates are downward biased 
due to measurement errors in the form of omitted dynamics in the fathers’ earnings variable. 
Based on nationally representative social security data, he presents intergenerational 
elasticities (IGE) for the US that are approximately 50 percent higher than earlier believed 
(approximately 0.6 instead of 0.4). Mazumder’s data are partly imputed due to top coding, 
and the number of observations is relatively low. Therefore he suggests that future research 
should attempt to verify his results using long-term measures of permanent earnings from 
other sources. 
Another source of measurement error with implications for the estimation of 
intergenerational mobility is discussed in several recent papers, notably Haider and Solon 
(2006), Grawe (2006), and Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006)1. Here it is argued that life-cycle 
variation in the association between current and permanent earnings represents a form of error 
where the classical errors-in-variables model is misspecified. The life-cycle bias adds to the 
standard errors-in-variables bias when current earnings is used as proxy for the fathers’ as 
well as the children’s lifetime earnings, with the inconsistency varying across fathers’ and/or 
children’s age. Controlling for multi-year average of current income cannot eliminate this 
measurement error. 
                                                 
1 Earlier contributions on the same topic, but within somewhat different frameworks, are Jenkins (1987) and 
Björklund (1993).  
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The present paper sits at the intersection of these two types of contribution. Our focus 
is on the effect of expanding the fathers’ earnings window similar to Mazumder’s analysis 
based on US data. But we also pay attention to the empirical findings of the research on life-
cycle bias, in that we attempt to measure children’s and fathers’ earnings at ages where the 
life-cycle bias is supposed to be of minor importance. 
Our data have several advantages: (1) they provide us with very long earnings series; 
(2) the sources are administrative registers, e.g., the public tax register, reducing the problems 
of self reporting errors, attrition, etc.; (3) they are census data and therefore highly 
representative and give a high number of observations; (4) they do not suffer from the 
truncation problems that are present in Mazumder’s data; and (5) unlike most other studies 
within this field, they include information about female earnings. 
We find that the intergenerational elasticities typically are much higher than those 
reported in recent Norwegian research, see for instance Bratberg et al. (2005) and Bratsberg et 
al. (2007). Extending the length of the fathers’ earnings windows from 5 to 30 years has a 
positive impact on the estimated elasticities. More importantly, keeping the size of the 
earnings window constant at different points in the life cycle reveals a strong negative age 
effect. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes various sources of 
measurement errors and biases therefrom. Section 3 presents the data used in the analysis. 
Empirical results are discussed in Section 4, while concluding remarks are given in Section 5. 
 
2. Sources of Measurement Bias 
The standard approach to the measurement of intergenerational mobility is to regress 
children’s earning on parents’: 
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(1) iii yy ερ += 01 , 
 
where subscripts 1 and 0 are child and parent, respectively, y is a measure of “lifetime” or 
“permanent” income in logs, ρ is the slope coefficient, and ε is a random error term.2 In 
addition, quadratic functions of both generations’ age are commonly added. ρ measures the 
intergenerational earnings elasticity (IGE) between parents and children. The closer to zero ρ 
is, the higher is intergenerational mobility. 
In spite of this striking simplicity, the IGE estimates have undergone considerable 
adjustments during the last couple of decades. This is basically due to measurement issues. 
While Becker and Tomes (1986) base their quite optimistic views on intergenerational 
mobility on a ρ of 0.2 or less, Solon (1992) as well as Zimmerman (1992) conclude that the 
IGE for men in the US is twice as high: 0.4 or a bit higher. This tremendous discrepancy is 
mainly due to a classical measurement error. Assume that the parents’ earnings in a given 
year t, ity0 , consist of the permanent component, iy0 , and a transitory component, itw0 : 
 
(2) itiit wyy 000 += . 
 
If, as in the estimates surveyed in Becker and Tomes (1986), the IGE is based on single-year 
observations of parental earnings as proxies for their permanent earnings, ρˆ  will be 
downward biased by the factor φ = )/( 202020 wyy σσσ + , where 20yσ  and 20wσ  are the respective 
variances of y0i and w0it. Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) apply up to 5-year averages of 
single-year earnings as their proxies. Averaging over T years implies that the factor of 
inconsistency (the attenuation factor) becomes )/(
2
02
0
2
0 T
w
yyT
σσσφ += . Clearly, the transitory 
                                                 
2 All variables are expressed as deviations from their population mean to suppress the intercept. 
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earnings shocks contributes more to the noise relative to the signal in the first compared with 
the second case, leaving the former estimates highly downward biased. 
However, the attenuation factor above rests on the fairly unrealistic assumption of 
absence of persistence in the transitory shocks. Mazumder (2005) follows Solon (1992) and 
introduces persistence in the transitory fluctuations in the form of a first-order autoregressive 
process:3 
 
(3) ititit ww 0100 νδ += − , 
 
where δ is the autocorrelation coefficient of the transitory component and it0ν  is white noise. 
The attenuation factor, still in the case of averaging over T years, becomes: 
 
(4) )/(
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.4 Even with these relatively simple earnings dynamics, the bias 
now becomes rather complicated. Mazumder (2005) performs simulations that demonstrate 
that even with quite a low degree of persistence (δ = 0.5) the attenuation factor becomes 0.69 
when using a 5-year average, as compared with 0.83 in the absence of autocorrelation (δ = 0); 
see Table 1 p. 238. This implies that Solon’s and Zimmerman’s estimates of ρ of 0.4 may be a 
30% downward biased estimate of a true IGE of 0.6. Furthermore, Mazumder (2005) 
illustrates that under these earnings assumptions one needs averaging over more than 25 years 
to get a reasonable value (i.e., close to one) for the attenuation factor, see Figure 1, p. 239. 
                                                 
3 Solon (1992) illustrates the case of first-order moving average and autoregression, respectively (note 17, p. 
237). Baker and Solon (2003) introduce non-stationary (random walk) as well as stationary components in their 
earnings dynamics models for Canada. 
4 See Solon (1984) for the derivations. 
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Another source of measurement error with implications for the estimation of 
intergenerational mobility is the life-cycle variations in the association between current 
earnings, yit, and permanent earnings, yi, for children as well as for fathers.5 This association 
may be modeled as ititit uyy 1111 += λ  and ititit uyy 0000 += λ , for children and fathers, 
respectively. These life-cycle variations represent a form of error where the classical errors-
in-variables model is misspecified. Firstly, in intergenerational earnings regression current 
instead of lifetime earnings for the children (i.e., the left hand side variable) also yields biased 
OLS estimates. Assuming that we have an appropriate measure of parents’ earnings, i.e., λ0t = 
1, but y1it is used as a proxy for y1i, the IGE estimates will be confounded by the children’s 
own life-cycle variation: 
 
(5) itiitit uyy 1011 )( ++= ερλ . 
 
The probability limit of the slope coefficient ρˆ  then becomes t1λρ ⋅ , implying that a 
necessary condition for the OLS estimate of ρ  to be unbiased is that 11 =tλ . 
Secondly, the life-cycle bias adds to the standard errors-in-variables bias when current 
earnings are used as proxy for the fathers’ lifetime earnings. Assuming that we have an 
appropriate measure of children’s earnings, i.e., λ1t = 1, the inconsistency when estimated by 
OLS now becomes:6 
 
(6) plim t
wyt
yt ρθσσλ
σλρρ =+= 202020
2
00) . 
                                                 
5 The typical life-cycle profile of earnings is concave, and more so the higher the lifetime earnings, indicating a 
more rapid earnings growth through most of the life cycle for the high relative to the low earners. Thus, early in 
the career the gap between high and low income workers is understated (and can even have the wrong sign), 
whereas it tends to become overstated at higher ages. 
6 Here any time averaging and/or persistence of the type in eq. (4) are ignored. 
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tθ  partly contains the classical attenuation bias Tφ  stemming from the transitory component 
of the fathers’ earnings. But in addition, tθ  contains the life-cycle bias stemming from the 
permanent component, with the inconsistency varying across fathers’ age. The size and 
direction of the total bias (attenuation plus life-cycle) becomes quite involved; in fact, it may 
change character from attenuation (negative) to amplification (positive), as demonstrated by 
Haider and Solon (2006). 
Finally, the fathers’ position in the life cycle may also influence the attenuation factor, 
Tφ . Mazumder (2001) and Baker and Solon (2003) both argue that the variance of the 
transitory innovation, 20wσ , follows a U-shaped pattern over the life cycle, with smallest 
values around the age of 40. Before and—particularly—after this period in life, the variance 
typically appears to be considerably higher. However, Grawe (2006) concludes that the 
evidence appears to support the hypothesis that life-cycle bias and not growing attenuation 
bias causes the relationship between fathers’ age and estimated IGE. 
In this study we start with the intention of correcting the potential bias stemming from 
persistence in the transitory earnings shocks. To isolate this form of attenuation bias, we need 
some sort of control for the potential bias stemming from the life-cycle variation in the 
permanent earnings. For this task our estimation procedure is as follows.7 First, we follow the 
estimates of Haider and Solon’s (2006) and Böhlmark and Lindquist’s (2006) regarding the 
periods of children’s and fathers’ lives where the tλ s are closest to one.8 In our benchmark 
case we condition on the period in life where tλ  allegedly is (close to) one. Any remaining 
bias in the IGE is then interpreted as attenuation bias. Like Mazumder (2005), the test 
                                                 
7 See Section 4 in Grawe (2006) for a discussion of alternative procedure(s). 
8 In this matter we are mainly guided by the results in Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006), which are quite in line 
with Haider and Solon (2006), and – more importantly – are based on register data that resemble the ones used in 
our study. It is also advantageous that the results are based on data from Sweden; a welfare state very much of 
the same kind as Norway. 
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procedure for investigating whether attenuation bias arises due to persistence in the transitory 
earnings component implies successively extending the length of the period for which the 
fathers’ earnings are observed. But unlike Mazumder we explicitly pay attention to the 
possible confounding life-cycle effect. 
 
3. Data Set and Variables 
Our data are collected from different administrative data sets linked together by an individual 
identity code for the entire Norwegian working age population. Our data contain the full 
series of yearly gross earnings from 1967 to 2002 based on mandatory tax reports, in addition 
to family characteristics and birth year. The incomes series were originally collected for the 
purpose of calculating old-age pensions. This implies that they basically include earnings, but 
exclude interest, capital income, etc. Unemployment benefits, disability benefits and sick pay 
are included, but not means-tested benefits. All the income variables were first adjusted to 
real 1999 income using the consumer price index. In addition, we discounted fathers’ income 
down to the year the child was born using a discount factor of 2 percent. Opposite to the data 
in Mazumder (2005) and Haider and Solon (2006), the earnings variables are uncensored, at 
the top as well as at the bottom of the distribution. This quality, together with the large 
number of individuals, allows us to use simpler and better estimation methods, which 
potentially improves on the precision of the estimates. 
We include children of both genders from the 1959–1962 birth cohorts. Earlier cohorts 
might have been included, but we refrain from it to avoid the possible confounding effect 
from trends in mobility across time.9 We limit our study to individuals whose compulsory 
schooling is at least 9 years.10 Later cohorts of children are not included, since we want to 
                                                 
9 Bratberg, Nilsen, and Vaage (2005) report a slight upward trend in mobility when they compare the 1950 with 
the 1960 cohorts. 
10 The increase of compulsory schooling from seven to nine years took place during the 1960s and early 1970s, 
with 1974 as the last year; see Aakvik, Salvanes, and Vaage (2003) for details and analysis of the effect of the 
 8
follow the individuals at least until the age of 40. In addition, the trend argument applies also 
in this direction. We also exclude individuals born by parents younger than 16 or older than 
40.11 
We also limited our sample to fathers born between 1927 and 1942. This means that 
we can observe the earnings of all the fathers at least from when they were 40 to when they 
were 60 years of age; a key period if we want to study the effect of life-cycle bias. 
Admittedly, this limitation results in a sample of fathers that had become parents somewhat 
earlier than in the overall Norwegian population.12 
For fathers as well as children, earnings are measured in logs; the averages are over 
log earnings. Being born in 1959–1962, our sons and daughters are between 40 and 43 years 
of age when our earnings series ends in 2002. We choose the common age of 36–40 for males 
and females as the years over which the earnings are averaged. We use fathers’ earnings as 
the only indicator of the family’s earnings capacity.13 For both sons/daughters and their 
fathers, the 5-year averages are based on at least 3 years of positive earnings, i.e., individuals 
with only two or less years of earnings are excluded. When we extend the size of the window 
from 5-year to 30-year averages, the corresponding requirements of strictly positive earnings 
are 5, 8, 10, 13, and 15 years. In our regressions, we age-adjust the fathers’ earnings by 
including fathers’ age and age squared. In addition, we control for potential cohort effects by 
including cohort dummies for the children.14 
Finally, observing the individuals at different points in time and for different time 
spans implies that the composition of the samples will differ. For instance, when one move 
                                                                                                                                                        
compulsory schooling reform on earnings. The 1959 birth cohort ended their compulsory schooling in 1975. 
Thus all the children in our sample had nine years and all the fathers seven years of compulsory schooling.  
11 We also excluded individuals born outside Norway and non-Norwegian citizens because of the high frequency 
of missing earnings information. 
12 The average age of fathers at children’s birth was approximately 32 years around 1960, while 28 years in our 
sample (based on the sample presented in Table 1, row 1) 
13 Using fathers’ earnings as a proxy of household earnings is not too unrealistic since the fathers typically were 
the breadwinners of the families, while mothers commonly stayed home for the cohorts analyzed in this study.  
14 One normally includes sons’/daughters’ age and age squared in the regressions. But since all offspring’s 
earnings are measured at the same (average) age this was not necessary in our analysis. 
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the year used as focal point for fathers’ earnings, some individuals drop out due to too few 
positive earnings observations in the relevant period. For the same reason, the samples that we 
observe for, say, 15 years need not be identical to a sample based on 5 years of observation. 
To avoid influence from the composition, the samples are balanced, which means that they 
are fixed within each table. 
 
4. Results 
We start out with estimates where the fathers’ earnings are averaged over a relatively short 
period (maximum 5 years). This allows comparison with other research. A major challenge, 
however, is to separate attenuation bias due to short earnings windows on the one hand from 
life-cycle bias on the other. As for the latter, Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) find no 
significant life-cycle bias from using current income as a proxy for lifetime income as long as 
current income is measured after the age of 33. As for the attenuation bias it may stem from 
persistence in the transitory earnings fluctuations or, alternatively, the variance of the 
transitory earnings in the chosen 5-year period may be exceptionally high. Mazumder (2005) 
and Baker and Solon (2003) find that the variance of the transitory innovation is lowest when 
the fathers are around age 40.15 Taken together, this implies that for fathers the age should be 
set to minimize age-related and life-cycle bias, and the earnings series should be long enough 
to deal with the persistence bias. Our benchmark case will be a 5-year average for earnings 
between 1967 and 1971, in which year the fathers’ average age is around 36. In the next step 
we construct earnings measures where we average progressively up to 30 years (1967–1996). 
As pointed out earlier, measurement error due to life-cycle variation also represents a 
source of inconsistency if present in the dependent variable, i.e., in the proxies for sons’ and 
daughters’ lifetime earnings. We note that for the male cohorts in Böhlmark and Lindquist 
                                                 
15 Grawe (2006) suggests that both fathers and sons should be measured near midlife when analyzing 
intergenerational mobility. 
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(2006) closest to the cohorts in our study, the life-cycle bias is only slightly positive and quite 
stable between the ages of 35 and 40. For the female cohorts the bias is much more volatile, 
but the late 30s and early 40s appears to be a relatively stable age. Hence, for the sons and 
daughters in our sample we use their earnings at age 36–40. 
Table 1 reports the estimated intergenerational earnings elasticities when we average 
over (maximum) 5 years only. 
[Table 1 about here.] 
The first row reports IGEs when the fathers are on average 36 years of age. For sons we find 
the elasticity to be 0.338, while for daughters it is 0.230. In the other three rows of Table 1, 
we test the effect of measuring the fathers’ earnings at later stages of their life cycles. Hence, 
in row 2 the average age is 41, 46 in row 3, and 51 in row 4. The time span over which we are 
averaging is fixed (maximum 5 years), so any changes in the estimated IGE are likely to be 
attributed to age and/or life cycle effects. Our results indicate a substantial effect from varying 
the fathers’ earnings age. We expect the variance of the transitory earnings component to be 
larger and, hence, the IGE to be smaller as the fathers get older. Moving the 5-year earnings 
window to 1972–1976 (when the fathers were on average 41) reduces the IGE to 0.282 and 
0.186 for sons and daughters, respectively, and the reduction continues to 0.163 and 0.117 for 
sons and daughters when their fathers are on average 51 years of age. If, as argued by 
Mazumder (2001) and Baker and Solon (2003), the variance of the transitory innovations—
and, hence, the attenuation bias—is smallest around the age of 40, we would expect a decline 
in the IGE also when we move to a lower average age. However, to the degree that an average 
age of 36 is sufficiently low compared with 40, this does not seem to be the case in our 
sample, compare row 1 with row 2 of Table 1. Life-cycle bias through the permanent earnings 
component is the alternative explanation to the strongly negative age effect. 
[Table 2 about here] 
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Table 2 reports the effects on the IGE of progressively increasing the number of years 
used for construction of the proxy of fathers’ permanent income. The four measures in the 
upper panel are based on fathers’ earnings averaged over 5 years (benchmark) and thereafter 
expanded to 10, 15, and 20 years, respectively.16 The intention is to illustrate the effect on the 
IGE of reducing the influence of persistence in the transitory components (see eq. (4) in 
Section 2). Moving from the first 5-year average17 to the 10-year average in row 2, there is 
actually a small movement in the opposite direction, for sons as well as for daughters. 
Extending the length of the window to 15 and 20 years, respectively, only gives small and 
insignificant decrease in the estimated IGEs. Hence, there is hardly any sign of bias stemming 
from persistence in the transitory earnings fluctuations. This is strongly at odds with 
Mazumder (2005), where the elasticities—somewhat depending on the sampling rules—often 
increase 50 percent or so when the period is expanded from 4 to 16 years. 
In the lower panel of Table 2 we exploit the fact that for a sub-sample of the fathers 
we have earnings observations for many more years than the 20 used in the upper panel. In 
fact, since we observe earnings for the entire population from 1967–2002, there might be 
some fathers for whome there exist 35 years of observation. The trade-off is length of 
observations vs number of cohorts included. In the lower panel we report the IGEs for those 
of the 1936–1942 cohorts that are observed for 30 years (1967–1996). Of course, this is only a 
small fraction (about one-fourth) of the one in the upper panel, so we do not expect identical 
estimates for the comparable periods. There is a tendency in the estimated IGEs of an inverted 
U-shape for sons as well as for daughters, with start (5-year averages) and end (30-year 
averages) below the start and end in the upper panel. However, there are still no signs of 
increases of the type reported in Mazumder (2005). 
                                                 
16 The corresponding requirements of strictly positive earnings are 3, 5, 8, and 10 years. 
17 This IGE is comparable with the first row of Table 1. It is not identical because the different balancing in the 
two tables results in slightly different samples.  
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Note that when we expand the window of fathers’ earnings forward, as in Table 2, 
both the length of the fathers’ earnings window and the fathers’ average age increase. It might 
therefore be that the expansion has a positive impact on the estimated elasticities, which is 
counteracted by a negative age or life cycle effect. As a way of separating persistence and age 
as the source of error, we hold the average age of the fathers constant by calculating earnings 
where all the averages are centered on 1974, when fathers are on average 41 years of age. 
Now any changes in the estimated IGE are likely to be attributed to the length of the observed 
earnings window. The estimates of this exercise are reported in Table 3. 
[Table 3 about here] 
In the upper panel of Table 3 the earnings are centered on 1974 (average of 1972–
1976). As long as we expand symmetrically18 the data limit us to 15-year averages at the most, 
but the pattern nevertheless appears to be relatively clear. The elasticity increases by 
approximately 30 percent, for sons as well as for daughters. This contradicts the findings in 
Table 2, where the extension of the window had more or less no effect of the estimates, but 
where no attempts were made to control for aging of the sample. According to the upper panel 
of Table 3, however, window extension appears to have a significant effect on the estimates, 
indicating that persistency in the transitory innovations does seem to be a source of bias in 
former analyses of the IGE. 
In the lower panel of Table 3 we expand symmetrically with average earnings for the 
period 1977–1981 as the center, implying that the fathers are on average about 5 years older 
than in the upper panel. As expected, the increased average age has a negative effect on the 
elasticities. As for the effect of increasing the time span of the observations, the same pattern 
                                                 
18 Since 1967 is our first year of observation, it was impossible to expand symmetrically around the period 1967–
1971. Instead we started out with the next age group in Table 1: 1972–1976. The IGE is slightly different in 
Table 3 relative to Table 1 (0.263 vs 0.282 for sons and 0.175 vs 0.186 for daughters). This is once again due to 
the balancing of the samples that resulted in different sample sizes.  
 13
as in the upper panel is revealed: a fairly proportionate increase in the IGE estimates for each 
5-year expansion. 
[Table 4 about here] 
In Table 4 we once again exploit the length of our series to test the effects on a sub-
sample of fewer individuals with longer earnings histories.19 In both panels we keep the 
average age of the fathers constant, while we expand the windows symmetrically, paying 
attention to the effect on the estimated IGEs. In the upper panel we demonstrate that the 
increasing effect that is revealed in Table 3 appears to continue, for sons as well as for 
daughters, both when we expand to 20 and to 25 years of observation. 
A second point to note when comparing the lower panel of Table 3 with the upper 
panel of Table 4 is that for earnings measured 1977–1981 the IGE in Table 4 is lower than in 
Table 3, and this is also the case for the two other comparable windows (1975–1984 and 
1972–1986). There may be several reasons for this pattern. Obviously, the average age is 
different. More specifically, the 1936–1942 cohorts in the upper panel of Table 4 are on 
average 41 years of age, which is 5 years below the average age of the 1927–1942 cohorts in 
the lower panel of Table 3. But if higher age of the fathers is associated with lower IGEs, the 
elasticities in the upper panel of Table 4 ought to be higher than the comparable ones in the 
lower panel of Table 3. Our findings indicate the opposite.20 In the lower panel of Table 4 we 
add 5 years of age to the individuals constituting the 1936–1942 sample. The result is 
equivalent to what we found for the 1927–1942 sample in Table 3. When we increase the age 
                                                 
19 As in the lower panel of Table 2 this implies that we have to limit our sample to fathers born in the period 
1936-1942, leaving us with about one-fourth of the sample in Table 3. 
20 These cohort differences might be due to our sample construction. Since the oldest cohorts are dropped in 
Table 4, the fathers were systematically selected based on family formation early in their lives. Comparing the 
fathers in Table 4 with the overall average of the 1936–1942 cohorts in our data set, we found that their 
educational attainment and average earnings over the period 1976-1980 is slightly lower. As for earnings, one 
might have expected the opposite, since the selected sample has a relatively long and stable history in the labour 
market (see Section 3 for details). On the other hand, the lower averages of earnings and length of education for 
the selected sample possibly are due to their reduced opportunity of taking part in the educational expansion that 
took place in Norway in the sixties and the seventies. In any case, the relatively low elasticity for the lower part 
of the earnings distribution is consistent with Bratberg et al. (2005) as well as Bratsberg et al. (2007). 
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of comparable samples the estimated IGEs decrease, as is expected if life-cycle bias is the 
driving force.21 
We conclude this section with a brief comparison with some previous findings. We 
start out with two Norwegian studies. Bratberg et al. (2005), Tables 2 and 4, find elasticities 
of 0.129 and 0.126, men and women respectively for children born 1960. The average log 
earnings of the children are measured when they are 31–35 years of age, while log average 
earnings of the fathers are measured in 1977–1981 when they are on average 47 years old. We 
know from the results of Haider and Solon (2006) and Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006) that 
life-cycle bias gives the effect that measuring children’s earnings too early will bias the 
results downwards. The findings reported in Bratberg et al. (2005), Table 3, also shows a 
pattern consistent with life-cycle bias.22 Bratsberg et al. (2007) report an elasticity of 0.159 for 
men born 1958. The earnings are averages over 2 years for both sons and fathers (1992 and 
1999 for sons, and 1971 and 1976 for fathers). If we assume that the age of the fathers on 
average was 32 years when the sons were born (similar to the average around 1960), fathers’ 
earnings are measured when they are on average 48 years old. This is older than in our study. 
Furthermore, an average based on two observations only may suffer from the attenuation bias 
already discussed. Thus, when comparing the results in our study and the ones reported in 
Bratberg et al. (2005) and Bratsberg et al. (2007), one should take into consideration both the 
age of the sons/daughters and fathers when their earnings are measured, in addition to the 
number of years over which the earnings averages are calculated. 
Grawe (2006), inspecting the effect of increasing the age of the father at observation, 
finds that “the average estimated earnings persistence drops [...] a little more than one 
                                                 
21 We also checked whether differences in exclusion criteria affect the level of the elasticity. In the upper part of 
Table 4 we required at least 13 out of 25 years with positive earnings observations. When we applied the 
exclusion criterion of Table 3 (at least 8 out of 15 years with positive earnings observations) we found no 
significant differences in the level of the elasticity. 
22 The results reported in Bratberg et al. (2005) are opposite for men and women when it comes to elasticities 
based on varying ages of the children. This is, however, consistent with the differences between men and women 
in life-cycle biases reported in Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006). 
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percentage point per year” in the American PSID and NLS, the Canadian Intergenerational 
Income Data (IID), and the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). We find the 
corresponding numbers to be 1.1 percentage point for men and 0.7 percentage point for 
women based on the findings in our Table 1.23 Mazumder (2005), using the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation matched to Social Security Administration’s Summary Earnings 
Records (US) finds, based on the numbers reported in his Table 8, that the estimated elasticity 
increases by 2.1 percentage points and 0.9 percentage points for men and women respectively, 
for each additional year the fathers’ earnings are averaged over. Based on the findings in our 
Tables 3 and 4, our corresponding numbers are 0.5 percentage points for men and 0.3 
percentage points for women. Our findings are in line with Mazumder, even though the 
magnitude is somewhat different. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The extraordinary length of our generational data allows us to observe a substantial part of the 
life-cycle earnings of four birth cohorts born around 1960, and almost the entire life-cycle 
earnings of their fathers. We find two factors that influence the estimated intergenerational 
elasticities, and which we interpret as sources of measurement errors.  
First, there is a strong, negative age dependency. Based on fixed (5-year) averages we 
find that the IGE for the youngest group (fathers on average 36 years of age) is approximately 
twice the size of the oldest group (fathers on average 51 years of age), for sons as well as 
daughters. For fathers with earnings measured in their early forties and offspring in their late 
thirties—the period in life where, according to recent research, the age and/or life-cycle bias 
appears to be least of a problem—we find estimated IGEs of 0.282 and 0.186 for sons and 
daughters, respectively. Second, the estimated elasticities also depend on the length of the 
                                                 
23 This number is found by running OLS with the coefficient estimates in Table 1 as the dependent variable and 
the fathers’ ages as the explanatory variable. 
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fathers’ earnings window. Contrary to the age effect, lengthening of the window affects the 
IGEs positively. The estimates based on 15-year averages are 25–30 percent higher than our 
benchmark case with 5-year averages, for sons as well as for daughters.24 For fathers and 
offspring with the same age as above, the estimated IGEs increase to 0.343 and 0.227 for sons 
and daughters, respectively. 
The age dependence may be attributed to life-cycle variation in the permanent 
earnings component and/or variation in the variance of the transitory component. Like Haider 
and Solon (2006), Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006), and Grawe (2006), we consider the first of 
these sources to be the most likely, although this was not formally tested in the present paper. 
Like Mazumder (2005) we interpret the influence from the length of the fathers’ earnings 
window as an indication of bias stemming from persistence in the transitory earnings 
component. Hence, there are (at least) two sources of bias to take into account in the 
estimation of the IGE, of which life-cycle bias appears to be the more important in our case. 
Our IGE estimates are higher than those reported in recent Norwegian research, e.g., 
Bratberg et al. (2005) and Bratsberg et al. (2007). The upward correction of the 
intergenerational earnings persistence is also the tendency in recent analysis based on US 
data. Hence, in relative terms Norway is still a country characterized by high intergenerational 
earnings mobility.  
                                                 
24 Not even with a period of 15 years this effect seems to be exhausted: there is an additional positive effect of 
extending the period to 25 years, although the age of the fathers in the latter case is higher than recommended. 
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Table 1: Intergenerational earnings mobility estimates for sons and daughters
Length of time span constant, increasing fathers' age (earnings from 1967-1971 to 1982-1986)
Son-father elasticities Daughter-father elasticities
Coef. Std. err. Fathers' av. age Coef. Std. err. Fathers' av. age
Fath earn 1967-1971 0.3383 0.0074 36.1 0.2300 0.0089 36.1
Fath earn 1972-1976 0.2817 0.0062 41.1 0.1864 0.0076 41.1
Fath earn 1977-1981 0.2534 0.0060 46.1 0.1640 0.0073 46.1
Fath earn 1982-1986 0.1632 0.0043 51.1 0.1173 0.0052 51.0
Cohorts of fathers 1927-1942 1927-1942
No. of observations 57510 53481
Notes: Dependent variable is average of children's log earnings for age 36-40. 1959-1962 birth cohorts.   
Fathers' log earnings measure: 5-year average at increasing ages.
Children's log earnings regressed on log fathers' earnings, fathers' age and age squared, and dummies for children's birth cohorts.
The sample is balanced, i.e. same individuals observed in all time period within the table.
Only years with earnings > 0 are included. Five-year averages for fathers are based on at least 3 years with earnings > 0.
Table 2: Intergenerational earnings mobility estimates for sons and daughters
Expanding earnings window, and age (earnings starting in 1967)
Upper panel Son-father elasticities Daughter-father elasticities
Coef. Std. err. Fathers' av. age Coef. Std. err. Fathers' av. age
Fath earn 1967-1971 0.3356 0.0070 36.1 0.2277 0.0085 36.1
Fath earn 1967-1976 0.3412 0.0068 38.6 0.2304 0.0082 38.6
Fath earn 1967-1981 0.3406 0.0067 41.1 0.2280 0.0081 41.1
Fath earn 1967-1986 0.3203 0.0062 43.5 0.2171 0.0075 43.4
Cohorts of fathers 1927-1942 1927-1942
No. of observations 60408 56193
Lower panel Son-father elasticities Daughter-father elasticities
Coef. Std. err. Fathers' av. age Coef. Std. err. Fathers' av. age
Fath earn 1967-1971 0.3223 0.0138 31.1 0.1787 0.0187 31.1
Fath earn 1967-1976 0.3399 0.0156 33.6 0.2061 0.0189 33.6
Fath earn 1967-1981 0.3568 0.0158 36.1 0.2159 0.0190 36.1
Fath earn 1967-1986 0.3520 0.0150 38.5 0.2099 0.0179 38.5
Fath earn 1967-1991 0.3223 0.0138 40.9 0.1893 0.0165 40.9
Fath earn 1967-1996 0.2878 0.0129 43.1 0.1798 0.0154 43.1
Cohorts of fathers 1936-1942 1936-1942
No. of observations 15977 14878
Notes: Dependent variable is average of children's log earnings for age 36-40. 1959-1962 birth cohorts.   
Fathers' log earnings measure: increasing averages at increasing ages.
Children's log earnings regressed on log fathers' earnings, fathers' age and age squared, and dummies for children's birth cohorts.
The sample is balanced, i.e. same individuals in all time period within each panel, but separately for upper and lower panel, respectively.
Only years with earnings > 0 are included. Five-year averages for fathers are based on at least 3 years with earnings > 0.
Corresponding requirements of positive earnings when expanding to 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30 observations are 5, 8, 10, 13, and 15 years.  
Table 3: Intergenerational earnings mobility estimates for sons and daughters
Increase length of window and keep age constant (earnings centered in 1974, and 1979)
Upper panel Son-father elasticities Daughter-father elasticities
Coef. Std. err. Fathers' av. age Coef. Std. err. Fathers' av. age
Fath earn 1972-1976 0.2631 0.0056 41.1 0.1746 0.0074 41.4
Fath earn 1970-1979 0.3040 0.0061 41.6 0.2019 0.0077 41.6
Fath earn 1967-1981 0.3429 0.0066 41.1 0.2271 0.0080 41.1
Cohorts of fathers 1927-1942 1927-1942
No. of observations 60867 56567
Lower panel Son-father elasticities Daughter-father elasticities
Coef. Std. err. Fathers' av. age Coef. Std. err. Fathers' av. age
Fath earn 1977-1981 0.2348 0.0054 46.1 0.1488 0.0066 46.1
Fath earn 1975-1984 0.2565 0.0055 46.6 0.1658 0.0067 46.5
Fath earn 1972-1986 0.2803 0.0057 46.0 0.1852 0.0069 46.0
Cohorts of fathers 1927-1942 1927-1942
No. of observations 60522 56232
Notes: Dependent variable is average of children's log earnings for age 36-40. 1959-1962 birth cohorts.   
Fathers' log earnings measure: increasing averages at constant ages.
Children's log earnings regressed on log fathers' earnings, fathers' age and age squared, and dummies for children's birth cohorts.
The sample is balanced, i.e. same individuals in all time period within each panel, but separately for upper and lower panel, respectively.
Only years with earnings > 0 are included. Five-year averages for fathers are based on at least 3 years with earnings > 0.
Corresponding requirements of positive earnings when expanding to 10 and 15 observations are 5 and 8 years.  
Table 4: Intergenerational earnings mobility estimates for sons and daughters
Increase length of window and keep age constant (earnings centered in 1979, and 1984)
Upper panel Son-father elasticities Daughter-father elasticities
Coef. Std. err. Fathers' av. age Coef. Std. err. Fathers' av. age
Fath earn 1977-1981 0.2101 0.0115 41.1 0.1319 0.0141 41.1
Fath earn 1975-1984 0.2382 0.0119 41.6 0.1552 0.0066 41.6
Fath earn 1972-1986 0.2693 0.0125 41.0 0.1730 0.0149 41.0
Fath earn 1970-1989 0.2752 0.0125 41.5 0.1791 0.0150 41.4
Fath earn 1967-1991 0.2952 0.0131 40.9 0.1879 0.0157 40.9
Cohorts of fathers
No. of observations 1936-1942 1936-1942
16470 15320
Lower panel Son-fathers elasticities Daughter-father elasticities
Coef. Std. err. Fathers' av. age Coef. Std. err. Fathers' av. age
Fath earn 1982-1986 0.1616 0.0092 46.1 0.1063 0.0106 46.1
Fath earn 1980-1989 0.1872 0.0100 46.5 0.1203 0.0115 46.5
Fath earn 1977-1991 0.2169 0.0108 46.0 0.1350 0.0126 46.0
Cohorts of fathers 1936-1942 1936-1942
No. of observations 15931 14821
Notes: Dependent variable is average of children's log earnings for age 36-40. 1959-62 birth cohorts.   
Fathers' log earnings measure: increasing averages at constant ages.
Children's log earnings regressed on log fathers' earnings, fathers' age and age squared, and dummies for children's birth cohorts.
The sample is balanced, i.e. same individuals in all time period within each panel, but separately for upper and lower panel, respectively.
Only years with earnings > 0 are included. Five-year averages for fathers are based on at least 3 years with earnings > 0.
Corresponding requirements of positive earnings when expanding to 10, 15, 20, and 25 observations are 5, 8, 10, and 13 years. 
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